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It has been a great pleasure to read Sionaidh Douglas-Scott’s marvellous analysis of
why the EU should welcome an independent Scotland. I have to admit that I agree
with about everything that she says, which for purposes of this symposium is not the
most exciting starting-point. But overall there is disagreement of course, including
with such luminaries as Commission President Barroso and Professors Crawford
and Boyle. My comments here focus on three points – constitutional, doctrinal, and
practical.
This symposium is, appropriately, posted on Verfassungsblog.  As Sionaidh rightly
points out, the question of an independent Scotland’s relationship with the EU
must surely be approached from an EU law perspective. This does not exclude the
relevance of public international law. The EU respects international law, and the
founding Treaties are international legal acts. What this means, in a nutshell, is that
both EU law and international law must be complied with. But international law is
flexible as regards questions of State succession, and the primary focus should be
on what EU law has to say on the matter.  Now, whatever the merits of this 50 years
old legal evolution, EU law clearly conceives of itself as a form of constitutional law,
grafted upon its international law foundations. It is a sui generis type of constitutional
law, which as Sionaidh emphasizes does not just revolve around traditional State
sovereignty, but includes the direct conferral of individual rights.  Her analysis is
excellent, but can be taken even further. In Van Gend en Loos the Court of Justice
not only established that the EU Treaties confer rights on individuals; it established
that the subjects of this new legal order comprise not only Member States but also
their nationals. EU citizens have equal “ownership” of this constitutional order as the
Member States. This mixed ownership permeates the Lisbon Treaty, including its
dual concept of representative democracy (Art 10 EU).
Of course the default legal position seems to be that, upon independence, the EU
Treaties simply no longer apply to Scotland, as it is no longer part of the United
Kingdom. But imagine a Polish plumber who has set up shop in Scotland some
years ago, whose business is flourishing, and who finds himself, from one day to
the next, bereft of all his EU law rights, his life and work plunged in a state of great
uncertainty.  To make matters worse, the new Scotland is actually on his side, as
it seeks to continue membership.  He would lose his rights, purely as a result of
the EU (meaning the EU institutions and Member States) refusing to arrange for
Scotland’s continued membership. To me this would be a clear and grave breach of
EU constitutional law.
The doctrinal point concerns Art 50 TEU on withdrawal from the EU. This provision,
to which Sionaidh rightly draws attention, has a clear implication for Scottish
independence: that there needs to be a negotiation. Such independence is, in
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effect, equivalent to a partial withdrawal by the United Kingdom from the EU, if
the independence is left to its own devices and Scottish continued membership
is not accepted (the default position).  The Art 50 requirement of negotiations is
clearly inspired by the need to ensure a smooth transition in the event of a Member
State’s withdrawal. At the Convention on the Future of Europe there were actually
three proposals, which Tatham characterises as State primacy (no conditions),
federal primacy (prohibition on withdrawal) and federal control (withdrawal as a
mutually negotiated activity – see Biondi Eeckhout and Ripley, EU Law after Lisbon
at 147-148). It is the latter approach which was accepted, and which confirms the
EU’s practice of seeking negotiated solutions to membership questions (accessions,
Algeria, Greenland, German reunification).
These negotiations will need to start as soon as future independence is definite.
Given that Scotland is already in the EU, it surely complies with the conditions
for membership.  Whether the amendment procedure of Art 48 TEU needs to be
followed or the accession process of Art 49 is open to debate.  The disadvantage of
the former is that a Convention would need to be set up, followed by a Conference
of Member State representatives.  That seems rather unnecessary for a mere
continuation of membership. It seems to me that a slightly creative reading of Art
49 would enable to soon-to-be independent Scottish State to make a membership
application.
My practical point is that surely there would be a negotiation in the real EU world.
A mere Scottish referendum, endorsed by Westminster, does not automatically
create an independent Scotland which the EU recognizes as such.  Even if only one
current Member State refuses to recognize the new Scotland, that Member State
may continue to demand that the United Kingdom ensure that EU law be respected
in Scotland. It seems rather clear that there will be more than one Member State
government which will want to see the nature of their country’s future relations
with the new Scotland, prior to recognition.  Think only of the trade side of things.
If Scotland effectively leaves the EU, it is no longer part of the internal market and
of the EU customs union. It could charge customs duties on EU imports. There
would need to be a customs border between Scotland and the rUK. The EU would
need to subject imports from Scotland to its MFN tariffs. Scotland’s WTO status
would be uncertain. Indeed, non-EU countries, particularly those that have trade
agreements with the EU, will also want to know what’s going to happen to their
trade with Scotland. The EU itself may incur international responsibility if it accepts
Scottish independence without ensuring that Scotland respects the terms of trade
agreed with non-member countries.
So negotiations there will need to be.
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